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In the last thirty years, the qualitative and quantitative proliferation 
of securitisation has been central to the evolution of financial markets and 
its associated instability phenomenology (Kregel, 2011). Still, a 
theoretical consensus on the working of securitisation, not to mention its 
macroeconomic role (e.g. in terms of growth or inequality), is still 
lacking.  
Securitisation consists in “the issuance of debt securities for which 
coupon or principal payments are backed by specified assets or by future 
income streams” (Eurostat, 2013, 5.104). Being collateralized by the cash 
flow produced by a predetermined pool of financial or non-financial 
assets (ibid., 5.110, 20.260), these debt securities are called asset-backed 
securities (ABSs). The collateral, inasmuch as it is part of the originator’s 
assets and thus can conceivably be used to satisfy other creditors’ claims, 
is segregated into legally separate entities called financial vehicle 
corporations (FVCs) (ibid., 2.90).  
In surveying the pertinent literature, Gorton and Metrick (2012) 
conclude that the most basic questions in securitisation are still open, and 
recommend the study of securitisation as “an opportunity to examine 
some basic issues in financial economics and macroeconomics”. Not only 
economists but also accountants lagged their theories behind this epochal 
transformation in the financial system (Arnold, 2014). Recent events 
unveiled the need for new statistics to capture the working of actual 
financial markets (Borio, 2013; BOE, 2014). As it happens, shadow 
banking developed in a theoretical and accounting vacuum. The 
popularized myth was that securitisation provided diversification to 
issuers, flexibility to investors, and ‘democracy’ to borrowers (cf. Cowan, 
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2003). This intriguing narrative supported shadow banking by indirectly 
discrediting the ‘oligarchic’ bias of relationship banking (credit 
constraints). 
After the crisis, the idea of ‘predatory lending’ superseded the 
‘democratic collateral’ myth and economists were forced to reconsider 
their conventional simplistic account of the macroeconomic role of 
financial markets. The macroeconomics of shadow banking is, however, 
still at an embryonic stage (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014; Moreira 
and Savov, 2014; Pozsar, 2015). Many scholars draw inspiration from the 
minority reports of economic theory. In this sense, though not dealing 
with securitisation, the work of a number of staff economists at the Bank 
of England (BOE) deserves a special mention. McLeay et al. (2014) draw 
attention on bank deposits – by large the dominant medium of exchange 
in any modern economy – and suggest looking at their evolution as a 
consequence (indicator), not a premise (driver), of bank credit. The 
causality goes the other way round than the conventional doctrine 
pretends: lending creates deposits, not vice versa. Jakab and Kumhof 
(2015) trace a history of this unconventional doctrine and show that 
DSGE models with banks doing ‘finance through money creation’ (FMC) 
can predict changes in bank lending that are much more meaningful than 
those predicted by DSGE models with banks doing ‘intermediation of 
loanable funds’ (ILF). 
In this workflow at the BOE, however, shadow banking is not an 
issue as yet: it’s all about ‘pure and simple’ banking. The present article 
comes to grips with the difference between shadow and relationship 
banking through a FMC perspective. 1  Here, relationship and shadow 
banking are restrictively interpreted as the originate-to-hold (OTH) and 
the originate-to-distribute (OTD) models of banking, respectively. 
Economists are used to consider OTH and OTD as models of credit risk 
management: banks are supposed to originate their own (illiquid) assets 
and either hold or distribute the associated credit risks (e.g. 
Brunnermeier, 2009; Bord and Santos, 2012). In the OTH model, banks 
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would originate loans and hold them, managing credit risk by screening 
and monitoring borrowers; in the OTD model, banks would originate 
loans whose credit risk is distributed through securitisation procedures 
(Gennaioli et al., 2013).  
I deem this perspective on OTH and OTD questionable: how could 
one originate (issue) his/her own assets? I rather argue that banks can 
only originate (issue) their own liabilities, e.g. deposits (OTH) or asset-
backed-securities (OTD). Accordingly, the OTH and OTD approaches 
should rather be interpreted as alternative approaches to the management 
of the rise in liquidity risk associated with (inside) money creation 
(FMC). 
Banks create money when purchasing the IOUs that borrowers 
originate. Of course, these obligations are worth the sum of principal and 
interest, with banks paying out no more than the principal. The critical 
feature of a FMC perspective is that banks do not disburse excess 
reserves but literally create their own funding out of nothing, by simply 
crediting a borrower’s accounts of that principal. Inside money is created 
by the stroke of a pen and is progressively destroyed as the borrower’s 
debt is repaid. 
The fact that borrowers’ issuance of IOUs lays the first stone of the 
bank lending process implies that (inside) money creation is driven by 
borrowers’ demand for liquidity (debt supply): this concept is what the 
reference in the title to the ‘economics of depression’ hints at. Keynes 
([1936] 1973) emphasised the role of the state of long-term expectations 
– confidence in non-financial investment opportunities (animal spirits) – 
as the key driver of macroeconomic dynamics. However, Keynes may 
have overplayed the role of meta-economic determinants as he insisted 
too little that animal spirits (“defeat the dark forces of time and ignorance 
which envelop our future”, p. 155) must be first and mostly considered in 
relation to the parallel state of confidence in financial investment 
opportunities (“beat the gun”, ibid.). This was conceivably due to the fact 
that his General Theory “omit[ted] express reference to short-term 
expectations” (ibid, p. 50, italics in original). 
This omission has had a tremendous impact on the birth and 
development of macroeconomics. Contemporary mainstream macro models 
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are essentially based on three equations: one for the demand side, one for the 
supply side, and one for the policy maker’s behaviour. The demand side is 
typically encapsulated in the IS curve, which captures the way current 
expenditure affects aggregate output. When expenditure equals output, an 
equilibrium in the goods market is realized, so that planned investment  
equates saving : that is how the IS-based approach implies the ILF theory 
of banking. The connection of this approach with the “efficient market” and 
similar hypotheses that let macroeconomists do macroeconomics-without-
finance is only too obvious. 
In a sense, this paper explores whether a FMC theory of banking 
implies a reconsideration of demand-side macro theory as well, which is 
why these pages heavily rely on accounting. Both the birth of 
macroeconomics and the spread of economic management principles in 
modern societies owe much to the movement of accounting 
expressionism (Suzuki, 2003). The “money view” of shadow banking 
(Mehrling, 2010; Mehrling et al., 2013; Pozsar, 2014) draws on an 
accounting approach, too. Accounting is economists’ lingua franca. The 
model presented here captures a simple sequential monetary circuit: the 
sequence is so devised as to put the opposition shadow vs. relationship 
banking to the fore, and thus it provides a simple methodological account 
of the working of financial markets and their impact on the economy. 
Here, this impact is considered from an ex ante perspective, that is why I 
adopt “changes in balance-sheet” (LX) accounts rather than financial 
accounts (flows of funds). LX accounts record changes in the value of 
assets and liabilities occurring in the accounting period, and aggregate the 
amounts recorded in the various accumulation accounts (Eurostat, 2013, 
8.62). 
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1. Basics of the model 
 
Let us assume a macroeconomic system in which: 
(i) a non-financial corporate sector operates production plans; 
(ii) a financial corporate sector finances production plans through money 
creation; 
(iii) the public sector does not change its fiscal and monetary stance; 
(iv) households operate consumption plans; 
(v) non-profit institutions and the rest of the world are irrelevant. 
We can frame the question of the financial sector’s impact on the 
financial sustainability of a growth process through a simple yet far-
reaching hypothesis: the financial corporate is the only sector to actively 
manage the liquidity risk pending on its own characteristic operations. 
This is a strong assumption, especially as far as the non-financial 
corporate sector is concerned. 2  It is important to be clear about the 
shortcomings of this assumption. When we assume that non-financial 
investors do not actively manage liquidity risk, we put aside a great deal of 
the prudential dimension in their actual behaviour. In particular, production 
processes are regarded as if they were instantaneous (firms are 
unconcerned with capital formation: all capital is circulating capital) and 
market output as if it was unusable in subsequent periods (the households 
sector is unconcerned with carrying real assets over upcoming periods). In 
general terms, both firms and households are unconcerned with the 
constitution and management of reserve funds. That is why, in such an 
artificial environment, we are allowed to pass over the accounting of non-
financial assets and to focus on financial assets and liabilities.  
																																																								
2 Both the construction and the adjustment of productive capacity take time: at least 
temporarily, payments grow more than receipts. When commitments to non-financial 
activities grow, non-financial investors’ capacity to immediately face unexpected claims – 
namely the liquidity (flexibility) of their position – temporarily deteriorates. This 
(il)liquidity characterizes all time-consuming operations in a monetary economy and is 
fundamental to Hyman P. Minsky’s “Financial Instability Hypothesis”. Minsky’s point is 
that solvency risk goes hand in hand with liquidity risk – insolvency is less likely the 
more an entity is able to immediately pay for possible pitfalls: the more liquid an entity is, 
the less unchosen positions can force it to refinance its pre-existing debt positions 
(Mehrling, 2009). 
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The model also relies on the assumption that credit (inside money) is 
the only source of production finance. The non-financial corporate sector 
finances all production by issuing an amount  in IOUs, which the 
financial sector invests in, at cost 1 .  
The values of  and  (the discount rate, a function of the interest 
rate charged on loans) are determined by animal spirits, i.e. 
entrepreneurs’ confidence in the opportunity to start new production 
processes. The desiderata of a financer play an important role in the 
determination of  and , yet the issuance of this kind of obligation is a 
decision in the borrowers’ hands: no one can be forced to borrow against 
their will. The point that the debtor has the last word on the inception of a 
credit transaction highlights the general principle that, as far as financial 
items are concerned, one can only originate (issue) her own liabilities.3  
However obvious, this simple principle is apostate from an ILF 
perspective. As a matter of fact, acceptance of the principle implies that, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, financial institutions do not originate 
loans: rather, banks purchase loans (borrowers’ debt, worth ) and pay 
for them by originating 1  in transferable deposits 4  (bank’s 
debt/liability). There is no way to consider this loan-backed deposit as a 
liability banks originate to hold, though: borrowers borrow when in need 
of immediate expenditure capacity. One may rather consider this liability 
to be originated to be distributed. Be it as it may, here the OTH/OTD 
distinction is irrelevant. 
Whether a financial institution’s liability is originated to be held or 
distributed only becomes visible in the wake of the maturity mismatch 
																																																								
3 In a monetary economy, real (non-financial) liabilities cannot be originated at all. Yet, 
always and everywhere one can originate real assets (by self-employment of own labour). 
4 An anonymous referee alerts me that my accounts diverge from the standard literature 
on endogenous money and the monetary circuit in that loans, here, are not equivalent to 
the deposits originated to purchase them, whereas the effect on involved parties’ net worth 
should appear only in a later phase of the circuit, as the flow of interests is paid. As far as 
I can see, this difference is due to the fact that the present model adopts the economic 
accounting framework (changes in assets/liabilities, or LX), not the financial one 
(uses/resources, or ‘flow of funds’). However, in the present model I shall consider 
changes in financial assets/liabilities only. 
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implied by the loan purchase.5 In terms of net worth, the financial sector 
is better off (by ). However, it is in a less liquid position: its ability 
to meet unexpected liabilities (unanticipated downward risks) declines.6 
Thus, it may decide to sacrifice a portion of its change in net worth 
 in order to move towards a more liquid position. 
Traditional (relationship) banks can enhance the liquidity of their 
positions by originating liabilities of a different kind from the above-
mentioned loan-backed deposits. Banks can issue a second kind of 
deposit fund (assumedly worth ) that is backed by an amount 1  
in liquid assets.7 From a macroeconomic perspective,8 the latter will be 
households’ savings in the form of currency (or central bank reserves, but 
the present model abstracts from public facilities). As it happens, not only 
banks cannot prevent runs from taking place, they would rather see 
depositors not using ATMs at all. Until (relationship) banks consider the 
rise in liquidity risk associated to loans-backed-deposits adequately 
balanced by the increase in currency-backed-deposits, the latter type of 
deposits is indeed originated to be held. The alternative OTD scheme of 
liquidity risk management (hereafter LRM) is elicited in section 3. 
Once it is understood that money creation must be complemented 
with a parallel procedure of LRM, one can indeed retain the 
intermediation notion censured by many advocates of the FMC approach 
(e.g. Jakab and Kumhof, 2015). Banks do not intermediate final credit 
into final debt positions; yet, the need to manage liquidity risk does 
situate them in an intermediate position between final debtors and final 
creditors. However, the standard view of the direction of the 
																																																								
5 The lender is left with an extra amount  in illiquid asset that is matched by a liquid 
liability worth 1 . For the individual bank, this liability is likely to be ephemeral; 
for the banking sector it is not. From a micro-perspective, it all depends on whether the 
workers’ bank is the same as their employers’. 
6 The opposite applies to the borrowing sector: in terms of net worth, the non-financial 
corporate sector is worse off ; yet it is more liquid. 
7 Of course, the discount rate  is what determines the interest rate a bank grants to 
depositors. Often, the value of  is paid in kind (services). 
8 From a micro perspective, households’ deposits often consist of other (non-central) 
banks’ deposit withdrawals; from a macro perspective, however, withdrawals and 
originations clear each other, so that the difference consists in central banks’ liabilities, 
i.e. currency (outside money). 
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intermediation sequence must be reversed: final debt originated by non-
financial firms is reflected as intermediate credit in banks’ balance-
sheets; the associated liquidity risk urges banks to originate an 
intermediate debt, which in turn implies a (households’) final credit. The 
final debtor is the starting link (credit market) of the intermediation chain, 
the final creditor the final link (money market): final debt is a cause 
(FMC), not a consequence (ILF) of final credit. As opposed to the view 
implicit in Shin’s (2010) specimens of intermediation chains, among 
others, the money market is a kind of credit market, not vice versa. 
At this point, we need to make assumptions about the mechanism of 
expectations formation, in particular concerning the evolution of final 
debt. Let us assume that the debt originated by non-financial corporate 
borrowers first and foremost depends on shareholders’ willingness to 
invest in non-financial ventures rather than in financial ones. Denote such 
willingness by  and let this be named, for the sake of simplicity, animal 
spirits.9 When  grows (falls), the willingness to invest in non-financial 
ventures relative to the willingness to invest in financial opportunities 
raises (falls). Therefore, however elusive a relative measure of two 
sentiments may be, one can recognize the difference in income realized in 
a previous period by non-financial Π  and financial  corporations as 
a possible index of the current state of animal spirits: Π R . 
This index embodies a sustainability principle, too: as soon as non-
financial corporate incomes exceed financial ones, not only the latter are 
paid off, but the groundwork for these to grow (in the footsteps of new 
debt and non-financial investment) is laid too. 
When production is instantaneous, rents – defined as per Eurostat 
(2013, 4.72) and consistently with the vertically integrated production 
that the present setting involves – are absorbed into the cost of labour, 
1 . If we assume that at the end of each period the non-financial 
and financial corporate sectors distribute all incomes they realize to 
corporates’ owners (the households sector), we can emphasize that the 
fundamental driver of the system’s dynamics  is a function of the 
structure of property incomes. Such structure is critically influenced by 
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the effective demand expressed by households , which in turn 
depends on the funds available to dishoard	 1  and on current 
labour incomes and rents 1 .  
In conclusion, abstracting from the role of general government and 
the foreign sector, we emphasise the interdependences of: 
(a) variations in entrepreneurs’ animal spirits, which in turn depend on 
the structure of property incomes distributed to owner households (Π 
vs. ); 
(b) financial institutions’ strategies of liquidity risk management (OTH 
vs. OTD);  
(c) households’ effective demand , which can be financed not only by 
current labour incomes 1  but also by pre-existing savings, 
in particular past property incomes. 
The underlying idea is that fluctuations in property incomes Π
, via their effect on expectations formation (animal spirits), lead to 
fluctuations in investment 1  that in turn drive fluctuations in 
spending . In such mechanism, savings 1  are a 
consequence, not a cause of the macro-financial sequence. The 
accounting structure of the present model is so set as to focus on the 
liquidity shifts that characterize a simple monetary circuit, without taking 
into account changes in stocks that are inessential to the above-referred 
mechanism, e.g. trading in equities. The circuit thus consists of six steps, 
i.e. changes in sectorial balance sheets (LX): 
 
LX.1. On the basis of the property incomes realized in the previous 
period (Π  and ), households determine both the non-financial 
and financial corporate sectors’ willingness to invest. Given the state 
of confidence, Π , non-financial firms originate a stock 
of current debt . This is purchased by the financial sector by 
creating ex nihilo 1  in deposits; 
LX.2. Abstracting from rents, when production is instantaneous the 
principal 1  is wholly used to pay for the labour provided by 
households (compensation of employees); 
336  PSL Quarterly Review 
LX.3. The financial sector manages the rise in liquidity risk associated to 
the new loans. This can be done following either an OTH (described 
in section 2) or an OTD approach (section 3); 
LX.4. Households fix the aggregate amount  of effective demand; 
LX.5. Both corporate sectors settle their own stocks of debt; 
LX.6. The corporate sectors distribute property incomes to households. 
On the basis of a new state of confidence determined by the 
distribution of Π and , the next period begins. 
 
After each step, we will determinate the cumulative effects of the 
process in the following accounts: 
LX.A = LX.1 + LX.2; 
LX.B = LX.A + LX.3; 
LX.C = LX.B + LX.4; 
LX.D = LX.C + LX.5; 
LX.E = LX.D + LX.6. 
Notice that the proposed model is based on two causal sequences, an 
inter-period and an intra-period sequence. 10  The former is the causal 
relation going from property incomes to animal spirits: this constitutes 
the most fundamental driver of the system’s dynamics and makes our 
approach one of economics of depression. The latter depicts the sequence 
of events taking place within a single period: borrowing (LX.1); 
compensation of employees (LX.2); liquidity risk management (LX.3); 
effective demand (LX.4); settlement of debt (LX.5); and distribution of 
property income (LX.6). 
  
																																																								
10 The double sequence is typical Hicks’s approach to sequential analysis. On Hicks’s 
general approach to dynamics see Bianco (2015); on his lesson for modern endogenous 
money theorists see Fontana (2004). 
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2. Relationship banking (OTH) 
 
At the end of each period, households receive from non-financial and 
financial corporate sectors all property incomes produced during it: 
respectively Π  and . The state of entrepreneurs’ confidence  is 
here assumed have the same sign of the difference in the distributed 
property incomes in the previous period, i.e., simplifying, Π R .  
The current period starts with an act of borrowing. The stock of debt 
 originated by the non-financial corporate sector in the current period is 
a positive function of . When entrepreneurs borrow, they originate IOUs 
(loans) consisting in liabilities for the issuers (non-financial firms) and in 
assets for subscribers (banks). In the issuer’s balance-sheet, the IOU is 
matched by a right to draw 1  from transferable deposits 
originated by the banks and credited to the borrower’s account. Such 
right is an asset for final debtors (non-financial firms) and a liability for 
subscribers (banks). The LX.1 accounts below depict the quadruple stock 
variations entailed by issuance of final debt (borrowing). 
Banks do not originate these deposits in view of holding them, 
though. Final debtors (non-financial firms) are meant to draw on them 
straight away: firms borrow 1  in order to finance non-financial 
ventures that are meant to eventually produce a cash inflow larger than . 
Production being instantaneous, firms’ expenditure ends in a 
corresponding increase in households’ assets (labour incomes). The LX.2 
accounts below assume that compensation of employees is executed via 
giro orders; and the LX.A accounts add LX.1 and LX.2 together. 
 
Table 1 – LX.1 accounts (borrowing) 
 
 
 
Note: in all tables, “dep” denotes deposits, and “c.n.w.” change in net worth.  
 
LX.1 LX.1 LX.1
dep (1−d)D dep (1−d)D
loan D loan D
c.n.w. −dD c.n.w. dD
NON- FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR HOUS EHOLDS  S ECTOR
borrowing borrowing borrowing
changes in assets ch. in liab. and n.w. changes in assets ch. in liab. and n.w. changes in assets ch. in liab. and n.w.
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Table 2 – LX.2 accounts (compensation of employees) and LX.A 
 
 
 
 
We assume that only the financial corporate sector actively manages 
liquidity risk. As far as this risk is concerned, such sector’s position has 
now worsened: the financial sector has financed an inflow of illiquid 
assets (loans) with an outflow of liquid liabilities (deposits). Thus, banks 
will be disposed to give up a part  of the expected interest inflow 
 in view of holding 1  in additional liquid assets and thus 
reduce liquidity risk. The financial sector thus originates liquid liabilities 
(deposits) worth  in order to obtain from households 1  in even-
more-liquid assets, e.g. currency. The reason for banks originate-to-hold 
such liabilities is that liquidity risk is effectively reduced as far as 
depositors (households) do not withdraw their deposits. The LX.3 
accounts depict this OTH-LRM operation; and the LX.B accounts add up 
LX.A and LX.3. 
It is up to households to play their game, i.e. determining the final 
value of effective demand . Let us assume that purchases of non-
financial goods and services are settled by giro orders, and let us recall 
that our assumption on LRM implies that production is instantaneous and 
that the goods and services produced in the current period cannot be 
carried forward. As a consequence, the LX.4 accounts below depict 
effective demand; and the LX.C add up LX.B and LX.4. 
 
 
 
LX.2 LX.2 LX.2
dep −(1−d)D dep (1−d)D
c.n.w. −(1−d)D c.n.w. Ø c.n.w. (1−d)D
NON- FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR HOUS EHOLDS  S ECTOR
NON- FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR HOUS EHOLDS  S ECTOR
compensation of employees compensation of employees compensation of employees
−(1−d)D 
+(1−d)D
dep
LX.A LX.A LX.ALX.1 + LX.2 LX.1 + LX.2 LX.1 + LX.2
dep Ø dep (1−d)D dep (1−d)D
loan D loan D
c.n.w. −D c.n.w. dD c.n.w. (1−d)D
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Table 3 – LX.3 accounts (liquidity risk management) and LX.B 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 – LX.4 accounts (effective demand) and LX.C 
 
 
 
 
 
All sectors having made their own characteristic decision(s), the 
cycle approaches an end with the settlement of all credit and debt 
positions (LX.5). This does not induce any change in net worth. 
LX.D accounts (LX.C + LX.5) show that: (i) property income 
Π  is financed out of households’ loss in net worth; (ii) its volume 
basically depends on effective demand . Since households’ loss in net 
LX.3 LX.3 LX.3
curr (1−f)F dep F curr −(1−f)F
dep F
c.n.w. c.n.w. −fF c.n.w. fF
LX.B LX.B LX.B
dep Ø curr (1−f)F dep (1−d)D +F curr −(1−f)F
loan D loan D dep (1−d)D +F
c.n.w. −D c.n.w. dD −fF c.n.w. (1−d)D +fF
NON- FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR HOUS EHOLDS  S ECTOR
= LX.A + LX.3 = LX.A + LX.3 = LX.A + LX.3
NON- FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR HOUS EHOLDS  S ECTOR
OTH-LRM OTH-LRM OTH-LRM
LX.4 LX.4 LX.4
dep C dep C −C
dep −C
c.n.w. C c.n.w. Ø c.n.w. −C
LX.C LX.C LX.C
dep C curr (1−f)F dep (1−d)D +F curr −(1−f)F
loan D loan D dep
(1−d)D     
+F −C
c.n.w. C −D c.n.w. dD −fF c.n.w.
(1−d)D     
+fF −C
LX.B + LX.4
NON- FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR HOUS EHOLDS  S ECTOR
LX.B + LX.4 LX.B + LX.4
NON- FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR HOUS EHOLDS  S ECTOR
effective demand effective demand effective demand
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worth is balanced by property incomes,11 no ‘paradox of profits’ seems to 
follow. The present model may rather be interpreted as an FMC version 
of the widow’s cruse à la Keynes-Kalecki-Kaldor (capitalists earn what 
they spend). 
 
This accounting sequence can be useful to draw implications in terms of 
dynamics. Given our behavioural assumption about variations in animal 
spirits (expectations formation),  is non-negative, i.e. non-depressive, 
when Π 0, that is 
.               	 1  
 
 
Table 5 – LX.5 accounts (settlement of debts) and LX.D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
11 	 	 1 	 	 	 . 
LX.5 LX.5 LX.5
dep −D dep −D
loan −D loan −D
curr −(1−f)F curr (1−f)F
dep −F +fF dep −F +fF
c.n.w. Ø c.n.w. Ø c.n.w. Ø
LX.D LX.D LX.D
dep C −D curr Ø dep fF −dD curr Ø
loan Ø loan Ø dep
(1−d)D     
+fF −C
c.n.w. C −D c.n.w. dD −fF
c.n.
w.
(1−d)D+    
+fF −C
= Π = R = − (Π+R)
NON- FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR HOUS EHOLDS  S ECTOR
LX.C + LX.5 LX.C + LX.5 LX.C + LX.5
NON- FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR HOUS EHOLDS  S ECTOR
settlement of debt set tlement of debt settlement of debt
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Table 6 – LX.6 accounts (distribution of property income) and LX.E 
 
 
 
 
Condition 1  implies that consumption must overshoot the cost of 
non-financial investment (  wages plus interest) by an amount not 
smaller than the financial sector’s net income .12 
When condition 1  holds, non-financial corporate incomes exceed 
financial ones, animal spirits heighten, and firms want to intensify 
production. In the following period, the non-financial corporate sector 
originates a larger stock of debt which reverberates on households’ 
confidence: rising labour incomes are likely to boost consumption plans 
and thus enhance, as far as money is concerned, the transactions demand  
 relative to precautionary demand . Since we assume that 
households do not actively manage liquidity risk, we can neglect this 
(easing) pressure, though. We are focusing on banks’ liquidity motive: 
when banks have no idiosyncratic motive to lean against this wind, by 
																																																								
12 In other terms, condition [1] implies that investment and consumption must be in a 
certain relation. The effective contribution of investment to effective demand depends not 
only on the quantity but also on the quality of investment. The issue more naturally arises 
in a model where production takes at least two phases (periods), one in which productive 
capacity is being built, and one in which it is used, so that producers must manage 
liquidity risk (the associated sequence of accounts is developed in Bianco, forthcoming), 
and the accounting of non-financial items does matter. In this more general case, a macro-
foundation of learning is directly implied: new investment (innovation) is so managed as 
to pursue the inter-temporal co-ordination in costs (investment) and proceeds (effective 
demand). Our assumption on LRM set this issue aside; yet, condition [1] takes it back in: 
this is important as it provides the rationale for our hypothesis concerning the dynamics of 
animal spirits. 
LX.6 LX.6 LX.6
dep − Π dep R dep Π +R
c.n.w. − Π c.n.w. − R c.n.w. Π +R
LX.E LX.E LX.E
dep Ø curr Ø dep Ø curr Ø
loan Ø loan dep Ø
c.n.w. Ø c.n.w. Ø c.n.w. Ø
NON- FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR HOUS EHOLDS  S ECTOR
LX.D + LX.6 LX.D + LX.6 LX.D + LX.6
NON- FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR HOUS EHOLDS  S ECTOR
distribution of property income distribution of property income distribution of property income
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rising  and/or  beyond certain thresholds, the financial sector is likely 
to ease the turn of events. Since they constitute a prime factor in the 
dematerialization of liquidity (and hence credit) risk, the success of non-
financial ventures is a major concern to the financial sector.13 Condition 
1  is therefore likely to self-fulfil. 
When condition 1  does not hold, there is a depression of animal 
spirits. In the next period, firms are likely to downsize their production 
plans and the associated debt  and investment 1 . Since we 
are focusing on banks’ liquidity motive, the fact that households are 
likely to boost the demand for money for precautionary motives  
relative to transaction motives , is of no direct importance here. Yet, 
this indirectly reinforces the tendency for banks, in depressed conditions, 
to negotiate higher s and impose lower s, which is likely to exacerbate 
depression. The excess of consumption over investment that is necessary 
for condition 1  to hold, and thus reverse confidence dynamics, must 
increase relative to the preceding period. 
An exogenous means to check this vicious circle is thus essential. In 
our setting fiscal policy cannot directly stimulate investment and 
consumption, hence what can be done amounts to reducing  and/or 
increasing . Unfortunately, there is little room to increase f. It is the 
bank, not the depositor, to originate (to hold) : banks have the final say 
on the conditions that apply to deposits. How feasible is it to make banks 
accept (deliberate) to pay more to manage liquidity risk, when depositors, 
given the assumptions concerning LRM, are likely to exert no pressure in 
this direction? However tricky, finding a way to reduce  would be more 
likely, provided that a role for the central bank and the general 
government is allowed for. Lacking this possibility by assumption, the 
impact of the financial sector managing liquidity risk under an OTH 
scheme must be recognized as pro-cyclical per se. 
 
 
																																																								
13 “Credit is the pavement along which production travels and the bankers if they knew 
their duty, would provide the transport facilities to just the extent it is required in order 
that the productive powers of the community can be employed at full employment” 
(Keynes, [1930] 1972). 
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3. Shadow banking (OTD) 
 
The literature on shadow banking and securitisation only began 
developing upon the offset of the Great Financial Crisis. Macro 
approaches to shadow banking and securitisation are still embryonic and 
based on the ILF perspective on banking – and hence on shadow banking 
too (the notable exception by Jakab and Kumhof, 2015, is not explicitly 
concerned with shadow banking).  
Having the FMC model of OTH banking in mind, I aim at presenting 
here an FMC perspective on shadow banking. Shadow banking is here 
interpreted as OTD banking, i.e. as an OTD approach to banks’ liquidity 
risk management. This interpretation is intrinsically tied up with the basic 
mechanism of securitisation.  
From a practitioner’s perspective, the import of securitisation is that 
it allows “to immediately realize the value of a cash-producing asset” 
(Cowan, 2003). Credit monetization can be accomplished in two 
alternative ways: by selling the credit to a financial vehicle corporation 
(FVC), or by issuing (and selling) an ABS collateralized by that credit. In 
the former case, there is a liquidity risk transfer parallel to a credit risk 
transfer; in the latter case, there is a liquidity risk transfer only (with no 
transfer of collateral). Yet, this distinction is not relevant in a macro 
model with a financial sector: even in case of “true-sale” of a pool of 
loans (final debt) to an FVC, the pool (collateral) does not leave the 
financial sector’s aggregate balance sheet. 14  Therefore, in 
macroeconomics, on-balance sheet securitisation is the relevant 
standard.15 
Let us assume a bank, holding a pool of illiquid assets, be it loans or 
securities (as collateral). In the opening balance sheet (LS) below, the 
collateral facial (or expected) value is . For clarity of exposition, let us 
																																																								
14 In a true-sale, “a securitisation corporation is created to hold securitised assets or other 
assets that have been securitised by the original holder, and issue debt securities 
collateralised by those assets” (Eurostat, 2013, 5.107). 
15 The distinction between off- and on-balance sheet securitisation may be relevant from a 
microeconomic perspective. Yet, even in that case a credit risk transfer does not 
necessarily take place: either way, securitisation consists in a scheme of liquidity risk 
transfer. 
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lay emphasis on the relation between an ABS issuer and an ABS buyer. 
This implies that the accounting sequence that follows rules out the cost 
of purchase of the collateral, which is precisely the source of liquidity 
risk the ABS issuer is managing. In doing OTD-LRM, the liabilities 
originated by banks consist in ABSs, not in deposits. Like in OTH 
banking, liquidity risk management is costly: the market applies a 
discount rate s on ABSs’ facial values. The sequence reported in table 7 
depicts the securitisation of a pool of assets worth , i.e. the origination-
and-distribution (LX.a) and subsequent settlement (LX.b) of a -backed-
security. 
Let us assume that the buyer is a depository corporation (a bank or a 
money market mutual fund).16 Debt settlement implies no change in net 
worth. However obvious, this point is particularly important when 
dealing with OTD banking, as it allows skimming through the complexity 
of securitisation procedures without losing essential information. Let us 
call the stock accounts resulting after the ABS is originated and 
distributed, but before it is cleared, the ‘interim balance sheet’ 
(LI = LS + LX.a). The interim stock identity, reported in table 8, retains 
all essential (and persistent) information involved in a securitisation 
procedure: the pre-existence of the collateral, the origination-and-
distribution of the ABS, the liquidity risk transfer (transaction in 
deposits) and, crucially, net worth equivalent to the closing accounts (cf. 
the LE accounts). Interim identities are thus suitable for evaluations of 
the ex ante impact of OTD banking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
16  If the buyer was not a depository entity, the accounts could be adapted with no 
substantial difference to the argument. 
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Table 7 – Origination, distribution and settlement of an ABS 
 
 
 
 
 
LS LS
col
n.w.
LX.a LX.a
dep dep dep
abs abs
c.n.w. c.n.w.
LX.b LX.b
dep dep
abs abs
c.n.w. c.n.w.
LX LX
dep dep dep dep
abs abs
c.n.w. c.n.w.
LE LE
dep dep dep dep
col abs abs
n.w. n.w.(1−s)D sD
D Ø
(1−s)D D D (1−s)D
Ø
Closing balance sheet Closing balance sheet
as s e ts liabilities  & net wo rth as s e ts liabilities  & net wo rth
− sD sD
D (1−s)D
Ø Ø
(1−s)D D
Net changes (LX.a + LX.b) Net changes (LX.a + LX.b)
c ha ng e s  in a s s e ts c ha ng e s  in liab. & n.w. c ha ng e s  in as s e ts c ha ng e s in liab. & n.w.
Ø Ø
D
−D −D
D
ABS clearing ABS clearing
c ha ng e s  in a s s e ts c ha ng e s  in liab. & n.w. c ha ng e s  in as s e ts c ha ng e s in liab. & n.w.
− sD sD
(1−s)D
D D
(1−s)D
ABS distribution ABS distribution
c ha ng e s  in a s s e ts c ha ng e s  in liab. & n.w. c ha ng e s  in as s e ts c ha ng e s in liab. & n.w.
D
D
(unaffected)
as s e ts liabilities  & net wo rth
ABS ISSUER ABS BUYER
Opening balance sheet Opening balance sheet
as s e ts liabilities  & net wo rth
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Table 8 – LI accounts (interim balance sheet)  
 
 
 
 
ABS originators have a special interest in distributing low-
discounted ABSs: the lower s, the lower the cost to immediately realize 
the collateral’s facial value (i.e. to monetise the credit). The discount 
rate s is a measure of buyers’ liquidity premium. ABSs are not as liquid 
as money and are typically purchased by other shadow banking units 
(FVCs). The fact that ABSs are typically not distributed out of the 
financial sector is due to the fact that securities other than ABSs allow 
greater economic and legal safeguards. ABSs are usually held until 
maturity by other FVCs that employ them as collateral to continue the 
liquidity transformation process, originating ABS-squared (also known 
as CDOs), ABS-cubed (CDO-squared), etc. Continuous liquidity 
transformation, while being a clear ingredient of liquidity risk 
management, was a key factor in the inflation in size, complexity, 
interconnectedness and layering of pre-crisis financial markets.17 
Let us sketch an approximation of a full-fledged shadow banking 
sector by abstracting from variations in the discount rate s down the n 
layers of the liquidity transformation process.18 Let  0 1  be 
																																																								
17 On the micro-structural complexity of the shadow banking system, see Pozsar et al. 
(2010).  
18 Constancy of  is not only unrealistic but also prejudicial of a consideration of the role 
of credit risk transfer instruments (CDS, IRS, and other derivatives) or liquidity 
enhancement strategies (most importantly maturity transformation), whose crucial role is 
to check discount rates, i.e. the originators’ cost of managing liquidity risk. It is worth 
noticing that maturity transformation in shadow banking has an opposite effect relative to 
relationship banking: in the latter case, maturity is typically lengthened; in the former, it is 
shortened. A model of ABSs markets liquidity crises (sudden stops) in which maturity 
transformation plays a key role can be found in Bianco (2014). That work deals with the 
LI LI
dep dep
col abs abs
n.w. n.w.
ABS ISSUER ABS BUYER
Interim balance sheet Interim balance sheet
D D D
(1−s)D sD
a sse ts lia bilitie s  & ne t worth a sse ts lia bilitie s  & ne t worth
(1−s)D (1−s)D
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the fraction of total cash flow from illiquid assets that is used as 
collateral. To keep things simple, let us also assume constancy of  
down the n layers. This double assumption lets us set up a tidy 
benchmark model to evaluate how differently OTH and OTD banking 
impact on macroeconomic dynamics. 
Financial corporations hold  in illiquid assets corresponding to 
liabilities originated by the non-financial corporate sector, purchased by 
originating 1–  in deposits. The associated liquidity risk is 
managed with an OTD approach: FVC1s issue ABSs for a facial value 
amounting to a fraction  of . In distributing ABSs, FVC1s cash 
1  in liquid assets financed by liabilities of FVC2s. FVC2s 
manage the associated liquidity risk by originating  in ABS²s 
(CDOs) so to cash 1  in liquid assets, and so on. Table 9 
shows this ‘creative wave’. 
It is further possible to capture what happens down the n layers 
with a set of interim balance sheets, as shown in table 10. Supposing 
(for the sake of simplicity) that the final ABSns (CDOn-1s) are held until 
maturity by the households’ sector, the interim balance sheet for the 
shadow banking sector as a whole would be as represented in table 11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																																																																																													
fragility of the shadow banking sector; the present one with its macro-financial 
sustainability. 
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Table 9 – The ‘creative wave’ (ABS, ABS², ABS³…) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
dep (1−d)D
col D
n.w. dD
dep (1−s)ψD dep (1−d)D dep (1−s)ψD
abs ψD abs ψD
c.n.w. −sψD c.n.w. sψD
dep (1−s)ψD (1−d)D AF.2 (1−s)ψD
col D abs ψD abs ψD
n.w. (d−sψ) D n.w. sψD
dep (1−s)ψ²D dep (1−s)ψ²D
abs² ψ²D abs² ψ²D
c.n.w. −sψ²D c.n.w. sψ²D
dep (1−s)ψ²D dep (1−s)ψD dep (1−s)ψ²D
abs ψD abs² ψ²D abs² ψ²D
n.w. sψ(1−ψ)D n.w. sψ²D
dep (1−s)ψ³D
abs³ ψ³D
c.n.w. −sψ³D
dep (1−s)ψ³D dep (1−s)ψ²D
abs² ψ²D abs³ ψ³D
n.w. s ψ²(1−ψ)D
LX.a  - Changes  in ba lance  s heet
LI -  Inte rim  ba la nc e  s he e t
LI -  Inte rim  ba la nc e  s he e t LS  -  Ope ning  ba la nc e  s he e t
FVC3
LX.a  - Changes  in ba lance  s hee t LX.a  - Changes  in ba lance  s heet
LI -  Inte rim  ba la nc e  s he e t LS  -  Ope ning  ba la nc e  s he e t
LX.a  - Changes  in ba lance  s heet LX.a  - Changes  in ba lance  s hee t
FVC1
LS  -  Ope ning  ba la nc e  s he e t
FVC2
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Table 10 – The ‘creative wave’: the interim-disaggregated perspective 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 – The ‘creative wave’: the interim-aggregated perspective 
 
 
 
 
The net worth of a full-fledged OTD financial corporate sector is 
limited by the amount of interests  paid by final debtors. The 
aggregate (interim) balance sheet lets us consistently compare our 
description of OTH and OTD banking. Notice that, relative to the 
previous sequence of accounts, the only critical variation takes place in 
LX.3, as shown in table 12. 
 
 
 
LI LI
dep (1−s)ψD (1−d)D dep (1−s)ψ²D dep (1−s)ψD
sec D sec ψD sec ψD sec ψ²D
n.w. (d−sψ) D n.w. sψ(1−ψ)D
LI LI
dep (1−s)ψ³D dep (1−s)ψ²D dep (1−s)ψⁿD dep (1−s)ψⁿ⁻¹D
sec ψ²D sec ψ³D sec ψⁿ⁻¹D sec ψⁿD
n.w. sψ²(1−ψ)D n.w. sψⁿ⁻¹(1−ψ)D
interim balance sheet interim balance sheet
FVC2FVC1
FVC3 FVCn (n>1)
…
interim balance sheet interim balance sheet
LI
dep (1−s)∑1..nψ
i
D dep (1−d)D+(1−s)∑1..n-1ψ
i
D
sec ∑1..n-1ψ
i
D sec ∑1..nψ
i
D
n.w. (d−sψ
n
)D
FINANCIAL CORPORATE SECTOR — OTD approach to LRM
interim balance sheet
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Table 12 – The accounting sequence with OTD banking 
 
 
 
(continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
LX.1 LX.1 LX.1
dep (1−d)D dep (1−d)D
loan D loan D
c.n.w. −dD c.n.w. dD c.n.w.
LX.2 LX.2 LX.2
dep −(1−d)D dep
−(1−d)D 
+(1−d)D
dep (1−d)D
c.n.w. −(1−d)D c.n.w. Ø c.n.w. (1−d)D
LX.A LX.A LX.A
dep Ø dep (1−d)D dep (1−d)D
loan D loan D
c.n.w. −D c.n.w. dD c.n.w. (1−d)D
LX.3 LX.3 LX.3
dep (1−s)∑1..nψⁱD dep (1−s)∑1..n-1ψⁱD dep −(1−s)ψⁿD
sec ∑1..n-1ψⁱD sec ∑1..nψ ⁱD sec ψⁿD
c.n.w. c.n.w. −sψⁿD c.n.w. sψⁿD
LX.B LX.B LX.B
dep Ø dep
(1−s)∑1..nψⁱ
D
dep
(1−d)D 
+(1−s)∑ψⁱ
dep
(1−d)D 
−(1−s)ψⁿD
loan D l+s ∑0..n-1ψⁱD sec ∑1..nψⁱD sec ψⁿD
c.n.w. −D c.n.w. (d−sψⁿ)D c.n.w. (1−d+sψⁿ)D
LX.4 LX.4 LX.4
dep C dep C −C dep −C
c.n.w. C c.n.w. Ø c.n.w. −C
NON- FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR HOUS EHOLDS  S ECTOR
NON- FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR HOUS EHOLDS  S ECTOR
borrowing borrowing borrowing
LX.1 + LX.2 LX.1 + LX.2 LX.1 + LX.2
NON- FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR HOUS EHOLDS  S ECTOR
compensation of employees compensation of employees compensation of employees
NON- FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR HOUS EHOLDS  S ECTOR
NON- FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR HOUS EHOLDS  S ECTOR
OTD-LRM OTD-LRM OTD-LRM
NON- FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR HOUS EHOLDS  S ECTOR
effective demand effective demand effective demand
= LX.A + LX.3 = LX.A + LX.3 = LX.A + LX.3
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(continues) 
 
 
 
The lesson of this sequence of accounts is that the only difference 
between OTD and relationship banking (OTH) is in the aggregate 
financial corporate sector LRM cost function – with  appearing in 
place of . Given our behavioural hypothesis Π R , under a 
LX.C LX.C LX.C
dep C dep (1−s)∑1..nψⁱD dep
(1−d)D 
+(1−s)∑a..nψⁱD
dep
(1−d)D 
−(1−s)ψⁿD −C
LX.B + LX.4
NON- FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR HOUS EHOLDS  S ECTOR
LX.B + LX.4 LX.B + LX.4
loan D l+s ∑0..n-1ψⁱD sec ∑1..nψⁱD sec ψⁿD
c.n.w. C −D c.n.w. (d−sψⁿ)D c.n.w.
(1−d+sψⁿ)
D −C
NON- FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR HOUS EHOLDS  S ECTOR
LX.5 LX.5 LX.5
dep −D dep −D
loan −D loan −D
sec ∑1..n-1ψⁱD dep ∑1..nψⁱD dep ψⁿD
sec −∑1..n-1ψⁱD sec −∑1..nψ ⁱD sec −ψⁿD
settlement of debt set tlement of debt settlement of debt
c.n.w. Ø c.n.w. Ø c.n.w. Ø
NON- FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR HOUS EHOLDS  S ECTOR
LX.D LX.D LX.DLX.C + LX.5 LX.C + LX.5 LX.C + LX.5
dep C −D dep
(2−s)∑1..n-1ψⁱD 
+(1−s)ψⁿD
dep
(2−s)∑1..n-1ψⁱD  
+ψⁿD−dD
dep
(1−d+sψⁿ)
D −C
loan Ø sec Ø sec Ø sec Ø
c.n.w. C −D c.n.w. (d−sψⁿ)D c.n.w.
(1−d+sψⁿ)
D −C
= Π = R = − (Π+R)
FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR HOUS EHOLDS  S ECTORNON- FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR
LX.6 LX.6 LX.6
dep −(C −D) dep (d−sψⁿ)D dep
C 
−(1−d+sψⁿ)D
distribution of property income distribution of property income distribution of property income
c.n.w. −(C −D) c.n.w. −(d−sψⁿ)D c.n.w.
C 
−(1−d+sψⁿ)D
NON- FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR FINANCIAL CORP ORATE S ECTOR HOUS EHOLDS  S ECTOR
LX.E LX.E LX.E
dep Ø dep Ø dep Ø
LX.D + LX.6 LX.D + LX.6 LX.D + LX.6
sec Ø sec Ø sec Ø
loan Ø loan Ø
c.n.w. Ø c.n.w. Ø c.n.w. Ø
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full-fledged shadow banking financial regime, animal spirits are non-
depressive when: 
                2  
When condition 2  applies, 1 . Let ̅ 1
 be the level of effective demand that is necessary to avoid 
depressing animal spirits. Once all possibilities to exogenously increase  
are ruled out by assumption, and abstracting from , the discount rate 
d emerges as a key variable in determining the elasticity of animal spirits 
to current performance. It is safe to assume a negative relation between  
and : when the current performance is such that animal spirits are 
positive, ̅  declines (net of the effect of  on ) and the condition to 
sustain confidence is easier to meet. On the contrary, when the 
performance is depressive to animal spirits,  is likely to increase and the 
condition to reverse depression becomes even harder to fulfil. 
The inherent role of shadow banking is depicted by the OTD-LRM 
cost function . The volume ̅  of effective demand that needs be 
realized in order to avoid depressing animal spirits is a negative function 
of : the higher , the lower ̅ , i.e. the less likely the current 
performance is depressive to animal spirits. Rising (decreasing) OTD-
LRM aggregate costs, , have a positive (negative) impact on the 
dynamics of the whole system: high  or  and low  are positive; while 
low s or  and high n have a negative impact. The analytical implications 
are straightforward: 
1) a high (low)  is good (bad) for growth: this highlights that, in a 
financial sustainability perspective, securitisation is not bad per se, 
as it is from a financial fragility perspective (Bianco, 2014); 
2) a high (low)  is good (bad) for growth: this implies a reversed take 
on the popular view that a healthy shadow banking system (where 
discount rates are low) must have a positive impact on the economy 
to the extent that it contributes to reduce  (the cost of credit for 
non-financial borrowers). As a matter of fact, condition 2  shows 
that reducing  can trespass into so-called predatory lending, that is 
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a pathology in risk pricing that lies at the heart of the subprime 
mortgage crisis;19 
3) that a high (low)  is bad (good) for growth implies that the financial 
structure ‘layering’, what Shin (2010) refers to as “long 
intermediation chains”, should be checked: from a financial 
sustainability perspective, the impact of the CDOs industry is 
negative, as it is from a financial fragility perspective. 
On the whole, securitisation does not have a negative impact per se; 
the present model suggests that its overall effect depends on two 
elements. First, market confidence in the liquidity of ABSs/CDOs, with 
which discount rates are in a negative relation; second, the size (n) of the 
CDOs (re-securitisation) industry. An obvious approach to check both  
and  is to enhance the costs of using credit risk transfer instruments,20 
e.g. through financial regulation. Current experience is showing how 
difficult such reform is (Montanaro and Tonveronachi, 2011; 
Tonveronachi, 2012).  
Finally, it is worth noticing that the peculiar form of our behavioural 
hypothesis Π R  does not affect the implications of the 
model concerning the impact of relationship and shadow banking: these 
apply whenever we assume a general form of expectations formation 
based on property incomes, such as Π R .   
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
In the years to come, macroeconomic theory will take into account 
the essential role of the financial sector in determining the business cycle. 
This applies not only to the role of traditional relationship banking, but 
also to the shadowy role of the modern market-based banking practices. I 
devised here a simple accounting model based on a Keynesian take on 
economic dynamics, in which the OTH and the OTD models of banking 
are reduced to a similar analytical structure. As it turns out, as far as 
																																																								
19 However, see Niccoli and Marchionne (2012). 
20 Credit default swaps, interest rate swaps, etc. 
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macro-theory is concerned the essential difference in the growth impact 
of the two models of banking lies in the form of the LRM cost function 
for the financial sector as a whole.  
In their macro model of shadow banking, Moreira and Savov (2014) 
rightly point out that shadow banking actually consists in a liquidity 
transformation process and underline that the conventional (Basel) capital 
scarcity view (fragility arising out of a shortfall in capital) conceals the 
actual role of intermediaries’ liabilities as the essential link between the 
financial system and the macro-economy. Their “liquidity view” is based 
on households’ liquidity motive; here, this motive is inherent to financial 
firms. 
A sense of contradiction between shadow banking and economic 
growth, financial resiliency and distributive justice is getting increased 
attention in the theoretical literature. As far as financial stability is 
concerned, for example, Luck and Schempp (2014) find that fragility is 
determined by the relative size of the shadow banking sector: the bigger 
this sector, the more fragile it is. A similar argument, with an emphasis 
on maturity transformation, is derived in Bianco (2014). As far as 
economic growth (financial sustainability) is concerned, extant literature 
has focused less on shadow banking. In general terms, Cecchetti and 
Kharroubi (2015) argue that by draining resources and skilled labour 
from the real economy, the growth of the financial sector results in a drag 
on real growth, in particular for financially dependent and R&D-intensive 
industries. In the present model, the financial sector has no employees, 
yet a behavioural assumption about the evolution of animal spirits 
provides a macro-foundation to a draining effect that applies to both 
relationship and shadow banking along diversified channels. 
A Kaleckian take on investment funding21 inspires our inter-period 
behavioural assumption: with some amendments, one may account for 
more refined distributive questions. The conflict underlying the present 
model, however, is not one à la Piketty (2014), of labour versus property 
																																																								
21 The effect of labour incomes on animal spirits is only indirect (via consumption), and 
the allocation of investment expenditure between financial or non-financial ventures 
mirrors the distribution in proprietary incomes. 
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incomes, but one of financial property incomes versus labour and non-
financial property incomes. 
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